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The roles of decoherence and environment-induced superselection in the emergence of the classical from
the quantum substrate are described. The stability of correlations between the einselected quantum pointer
states and the environment allows them to exist almost as objectively as classical states were once thought
to exist: There are ways of finding out what is the pointer state of the system which utilize redundancy of
their correlations with the environment, and which leave einselected states essentially unperturbed. This
relatively objective existence of certain quantum states facilitates operational definition of probabilities in
the quantum setting. Moreover, once there are states that ‘exist’ and can be ‘found out’, a ‘collapse’ in the
traditional sense is no longer necessary — in effect, it has already happened. The records of the observer
will contain evidence of an effective collapse. The role of the preferred states in the processing and storage
of information is emphasized. The existential interpretation based on the relatively objective existence
of stable correlations between the einselected states of observers memory and in the outside Universe is
formulated and discussed.
1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of the program of decoherence and einselection (environment-induced superselection) is to describe
consequences of the “openness” of quantum systems to their environments and to study emergence of the
effective classicality of some of the quantum states and of the associated observables. The purpose of this
paper is to assess the degree to which this program has been successful in facilitating the interpretation of
quantum theory and to point out open issues and problems.
Much work in recent years has been devoted to the clarification and extension of the elements of
the physics of decoherence and especially to the connections between measurements and environment-
induced superselection.1−10 This has included studies of emergence of preferred states in various settings
through the implementation of predictability sieve,11−14 refinements of master equations and analysis of
their solutions,15−17 and study of related ideas (such as consistent histories,18−20 quantum trajectories,
and quantum state diffusion21−23). A useful counterpoint to these advances was provided by various
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applications, including quantum chaos,24−26 einselection in the context of field theories and in Bose-
Einstein condensates,27,16 and, especially, by the interplay of the original information-theoretic aspects1,2,28
of the environment-induced superselection approach with the recent explosion of research on quantum
computation30−35 and related subjects34−38. Last not least, first controlled experiment aimed at investi-
gating decoherence is now in place, carried out by Brune, Haroche, Raimond and their collaborators39 and
additional experiments may soon follow as a result of theoretical40−43 and experimental44 developments.
In nearly all of the recent advances the emphasis was on specific issues which could be addressed by
detailed solutions of specific models. This attention to detail was necessary but may lead to impression
that practitioners of decoherence and einselection have lost sight of their original motivation — the in-
terpretation of quantum theory. My aim here is to sketch “the big picture”, to relate the recent progress
on specific issues to the overall goals of the program. I shall therefore attempt to capture “the whole”
(or at least large parts of it), but in broad brush strokes. Special attention will be paid to issues such
as the implications of decoherence for the origin of quantum probabilities and to the role of information
processing in the emergence of ‘objective existence’ which significantly reduces and perhaps even eliminates
the role of the “collapse” of the state vector.
In short, we shall describe how decoherence converts quantum entanglement into classical correlations
and how these correlations can be used by the observer for the purpose of prediction. What will matter is
then encoded in the relations between states (such as a state of the observer’s memory and of the quantum
systems). Stability of similar co-relations with the environment allows observers to find out unknown
quantum states without disturbing them. Recognition of this relatively objective existence of einselected
quantum states and investigation of the consequences of this phenomenon are the principal goals of this
paper. Relatively objective existence allows for the existential interpretation of quantum theory. Reduction
of the wavepacket as well as the “collapse” emerge as a consequence of the assumption that the effectively
classical states, including the states of the observer’s memory must exist over periods long compared to
decoherence time if they are to be useful as repositories of information.
It will be emphasized that while significant progress has been made since the environment-induced
superselection program was first formulated1−4, much more remains to be done on several fronts which
all have implications for the overarching question of interpretation. We can mention two such open issues
right away: Both the formulation of the measurement problem and its resolution through the appeal to
decoherence require a Universe split into systems. Yet, it is far from clear how one can define systems
given an overall Hilbert space “of everything” and the total Hamiltonian. Moreover, while the paramount
role of information has been recognised, I do not belive that it has been, as yet, sufficiently thoroughly
understood. Thus, while what follows is perhaps the most complete discussion of the interpretation implied
by decoherence, it is still only a report of partial progress.
2 OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
When special relativity was discovered some twenty years before quantum mechanics in its modern guise
was formulated, it has in a sense provided a model of what a new theory should be. As a replacement
of Newtonian kinematics and dynamics, it was a seamless extension. In the limit of the infinite speed of
light, c→∞, equations and concepts of the old theory were smoothly recovered.
When Bohr,45 Heisenberg,46 Born,47 and Schro¨dinger48 struggled to understand the implications of
quantum theory,49 one can sense that they had initially expected a similar seamless extension of classical
physics. Indeed, in specific cases — i.e., Bohr’s correspondence, Heisenberg’s uncertainty, Ehrenfest’s
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theorem — such hopes were fulfilled in the appropriate limits (i. e., large quantum numbers, h¯→ 0, etc.).
However, Schro¨dinger’s wave packets did not travel along classical trajectories (except in the special case
of the harmonic oscillator). Instead, they developed into delocalized, nonclassical superpositions. And the
tempting h¯ → 0 limit did not allow for the recovery of classical locality — it did not even exist, as the
typical expression appearing in wavefunctions such as exp(ixp/h¯) is not even analytic as h¯→ 0.
The culprit which made it impossible to recover classicality as a limiting case of quantum theory was at
the very foundation of the quantum edifice: It was the quantum principle of superposition. It guarantees
that any superposition of states is a legal quantum state. This introduced a whole Hilbert space H of
possibilities while only a small fraction of states in H can be associated with the classically allowed states,
and superpositions of such states are typically flagrantly nonclassical. Moreover, the number of possible
nonclassical states in the Hilbert space increases exponentially with its dimensionality, while the number
of classical states increases only linearly. This divergence (which is perhaps the key of the ingredients
responsible for the exponential speedup of quantum computations30−35) is a measure of the problem.
Moreover, it can be argued that it is actually exacerbated in the h¯→ 0 limit, as the dimensionality of the
Hilbert space (of say, a particle in a confined phase space) increases with 1/h¯ to some power.
The first resolution (championed by Bohr45) was to outlaw “by fiat” the use of quantum theory for
the objects which were classical. This Copenhagen Interpretation (CI) had several flaws: It would have
forced quantum theory to depend on classical physics for its very existence. It would have also meant that
neither quantum nor classical theory were universal. Moreover, the boundary between them was never
clearly delineated (and, according to Bohr, had to be “movable” depending on the whims of the observer).
Last not least, with the collapse looming on the quantum-classical border, there was little chance for a
seemless extension.
By contrast, Everett’s “Many Worlds” Interpretation50 (MWI) refused to draw a quantum-classical
boundary. Superposition principle was the “law of the land” for the Universe as a whole. Branching wave
functions described alternatives, all of which were realized in the deterministic evolution of the universal
state vector.
The advantage of the original Everett’s vision was to reinstate quantum theory as a key tool in search
for its own interpretation. The disadvantages (which were realized only some years later, after the original
proposal became known more widely) include (i) the ambiguity of what constitutes the “branches” (i.e.,
specification which of the states in the Hilbert spaces containing all of the conceivable superpositions
are classically “legal”) and (ii) re-emergence of the questions about the origin of probabilities (i.e., the
derivation of the Born’s formula). Moreover, (iii) it was never clear how to reconcile unique experiences of
observers with the multitude of alternatives present in the MWI wave function.
3 DECOHERENCE AND EINSELECTION
Decoherence is a process of continuous measurement-like interaction between the system and an (external
or internal) environment. Its effect is to invalidate the superposition principle in the Hilbert space of an
open system. It leads to very different stability properties for various pure states. Interaction with the
environment destroys the vast majority of the superpositions quickly, and — in the case of macroscopic
objects — almost instantaneously. This leads of negative selection which in effect bars most of the states
and results in singling out of a preferred stable subset of the einselected pointer states.
Correlations are both the cause of decoherence and the criterion used to evaluate the stability of the
states. Environment correlates (or, rather, becomes entangled) with the observables of the system while
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“monitoring” them. Moreover, stability of the correlations between the states of the system monitored by
their environment and of some other “recording” system (i.e., an apparatus or a memory of an observer) is
a criterion of the “reality” of these states. Hence, we shall often talk about relatively objective existence of
states to emphasize that they are really defined only through their correlations with the state of the other
systems, as well as to remind the reader that these states will never be quite as “rock solid” as classical
states of a stone or a planet were (once) thought to be.
Transfer of a single bit of information is a single “unit of correlation,” whether in communication,
decoherence, or in measurement.∗ It suffices to turn a unit of quantum correlation (i.e., entanglement,
which can be established in course of the (pre–)measurement – like an interaction between two one-bit
systems) into a classical correlation.
This process is illustrated in Fig. 1 with a “bit by bit” measurement1 — a quantum controlled-not (or a
c-not). An identical c-not controlled by the previously passive “target” bit (which played the role of the
apparatus pointer in course of the initial correlation, Fig. 1a) and a bit “somewhere in the environment”
represents the process of decoherence. Now, however, the former apparatus (target) bit plays a role of the
control. As a result, a pure state of the system
|σ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉 (1)
is “communicated” by first influencing the state of the apparatus;
|ΦSA(0)〉 = |σ〉S |0〉A → α |00〉SA + β |11〉SA = |ΦSA(t1)〉 , (2)
and then by spreading that influence to the environment:
|ΨSAE(t1)〉 = (α |00〉+ β |11〉) |0〉 → α |000〉+ β |111〉 = |ΨSAE(t2)〉 . (3)
Above, we have dropped the indices SAE for individual qubits (which would have appeared in the obvious
order).
After the environment is traced out, only the correlation with the pointer basis of the apparatus (i.e.,
the basis in which the apparatus acts as a control) will survive1−3,28:
ρSA(t2) = |α|2 |00〉 〈00|+ |β|2 |11〉 〈11| (4)
Thus, the apparatus plays the role of the communication channel (memory) (i) through its ability to
retain correlations with the measured system, but also, (ii) by “broadcasting” of these correlations into the
environment which is the source of decoherence (see Fig. 1b). Such broadcasting of quantum correlations
makes them — and the observables involved in broadcasting — effectively classical.29
The ability to retain correlations is the defining characteristic of the preferred “pointer” basis of the
apparatus. In simple models of measurement cum decoherence, the selection of the preferred basis of the
apparatus can be directly tied to the form of the interaction with the environment. Thus, an observable
Oˆ which commutes with the complete (i.e., self-, plus the interaction with the environment) Hamiltonian
of the apparatus: [
HˆA + HˆAE , Oˆ
]
= 0 (5)
∗It is no accident that the setups used in modern treatments of quantum communication channels34−36 bear an eerie
resemblance to the by now “old hat” system-apparatus-environment “trio” used in the early discussions of environment-
induced superselection1,2. The apparatus A is a member of this trio which is supposed to preserve — in the preferred pointer
basis — the correlation with the state of the system S with which it is initially entangled. Hence, A is a “communication
channel.”
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will be the pointer observable. This criterion can be fulfilled only in the simplest cases: Typically,[
HˆA, HˆAE
]
6= 0, hence Eq. (5) cannot be satisfied exactly.
In more realistic situations one must therefore rely on more general criteria to which we have alluded
above. One can start by noting that the einselected pointer basis is best at retaining correlations with
the external stable states (such as pointer states of other apparatus or record states of the observers).
The predictability sieve11−14 is a convenient strategy to look for such states. It retains pure states which
produce least entropy over a period of time long compared to the decoherence timescale. Such states avoid
entanglement with the environment and, thus, can preserve correlations with the similarly selected states
of other systems. In effect, predictability sieve can be regarded as a strategy to select stable correlations.
A defining characteristic of reality of a state is the possibility of finding out what it is and yet leaving
it unperturbed. This criterion of objective existence is of course satisfied in classical physics. It can be
formulated operationally by devising a strategy which would let an observer previously unaware of the state
find out what it is and later verifying that the state was (i) correctly identified, and (ii) not perturbed. In
quantum theory, this is not possible to accomplish with an isolated system. Unless the observer knows in
advance what observables commute with the state of the system, he will in general end up re-preparing
the system through a measurement employing “his” observables. This would violate condition (ii) above.
So — it is said — quantum states do not exist objectively, since it is impossible to find out what they are
without, at the same time, “remolding them” with the questions posed by the measurement.51
Einselection allows states of open quantum system to pass the “existence test” in several ways. The
observer can, for example, measure properties of the Hamiltonian which generates evolution of the system
and of the environment. Einselection determines that pointer states will appear on the diagonal of the
density matrix of the system. Hence, the observer can know beforehand what (limited) set of observables
can be measured with impunity. He will be able to select measurement observables that are already
monitored by the environment. Using a set of observables co-diagonal in the Hilbert space of the system
with the einselected states he can then perform a nondemolition measurement to find out what is the state
without perturbing it.
A somewhat indirect strategy which also works involves monitoring the environment and using a fraction
of its state to infer the state of the system. This may not be always feasible, but this strategy is worth noting
since it is the one universally employed by us, the real observers. Photons are one of the most pervasive
environments. We gather most of our information by intercepting a small fraction of that environment.
Different observers agree about reality based on a consensus reached in this fashion.
That such a strategy is possible can be readily understood from the c-not “caricature” of decoherence
in Fig. 1. The einselected control observables of the system or of the apparatus are redundantly recorded
in the environment. One can then “read them off” many times (even if each read-off may entail erasure of
a part of the information from the environment) without interacting directly with the system of interest.
It is important to emphasize that the relatively objective existence is attained at the price of par-
tial ignorance. The observer should not attempt to intercept all of the environment state (which may
be entangled with the system and, hence, could be used to redefine its state by sufficiently outrageous
measurement52). Objective existence is objective only because part of the environment has “escaped”
with the information about the state of the system and can continue to serve as a “witness” to what has
happened. It is also important that the fraction of the environment which escapes should not matter,
except in the two limits when the observer can intercept all of the relevant environment (the entanglement
limit), and in the case when the observer simply does not intercept enough (the ignorance limit).
This robustness of the preferred (einselected) observables of the system can be quantified through
redundancy28, in a manner reminiscent of the recent discussions of the error correction strategies (see, e.
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g., Ref. 38 and references therein). Consider, for example, a correlated state
|ΨSE〉 = (|0〉S |000〉E + |1〉S |111〉E) /
√
2 (6)
which could have arisen from a sequence of three system-environment c-nots. All errors afflicting individual
qubits of the environment can be classified by associating them with Pauli matrices acting on individual
qubits of the environment. We can now inquire about the number of errors which would destroy the
correlation between various observables of the system and the state of the environment. It is quite obvious
that the states {|0〉S , |1〉S} are in this sense more robustly correlated with the environment than the states
{|+〉S , |−〉S} obtained by Hadamard transform:
|ΨSE〉 = |+〉S (|000〉E + |111〉E) /
√
2 + |−〉S (|000〉E − |111〉E) /
√
2 (7)
For, a phase flip of any of the environment bits would destroy the ability of the observer to infer the state of
the system in the {|+〉S , |−〉S} basis. By contrast, a majority vote in a {|0〉E , |1〉E} basis would still yield a
correct answer concerning {|0〉S , |1〉S} if any single error afflicted the state of the environment. Moreover,
when there are N bits in the environment, N
2
−1 errors can be in principle still tolerated in the {|0〉S , |1〉S}
basis, but in the {|+〉S , |−〉S} basis a simple phase flip continues to have disastrous consequences.
When we assume (as seems reasonable) that the probability of errors increases with the size of the
environment (N), so that the “specific error rate” (i.e., probability of an error per bit of environment
per second) is fixed, it becomes clear that the stability of pointer states is purchased at the price of the
instability of their Hadamard-Fourier conjugates. This stabilization of certain observables at the expense
of their conjugates may be achieved either through the deliberate amplification or as a consequence of
accidental environmental monitoring, but in any case it leads to redundancy as it was pointed out already
some time ago28.
This redundancy may be quantified by counting the number of “flips” applied to individual environment
qubits which “exchange” the states of the environment corresponding to the two states of the system.
Thus, we can compute the redundancy distance d between the record states of the environment in the case
corresponding to the two system states φ, ψ given by {|0〉S , |1〉S} in the decomposition of Eq. (6):
d(φ, ψ) = N
while in the case of the complementary observable with φ, ψ given by {|+〉S , |−〉S}:
d(φ, ψ) = 1 .
Or, in general, redundancy distance
d(φ, ψ) = min(nx + ny + nz) (8)
is the least total number of “flips”, where nx, ny and nz are the numbers of σˆx, σˆy, and σˆz operations
required to convert the state of the environment correlated with |φ〉, which is given, up to normalization
constant, by:
|Eφ〉 = 〈φ|ΨSE〉 (9)
with the similarly defined |Eψ〉.
Redundancy defined in this manner is indeed a measure of distance, since it is nonnegative:
d(φ, ψ) ≥ 0 , (10)
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symmetric:
d(φ, ψ) = d(ψ, φ) , (11)
and satisfies the triangle inequality:
d(φ, ψ) + d(ψ, γ) ≥ d(φ, γ) (12)
as the reader should be able to establish without difficulty.
In simplest models which satisfy the commutation condition, Eq. (5), the most predictable set of states
will consist of the eigenstates of the pointer observable Oˆ. They will not evolve at all and, hence, will
be perfect memory states as well as the most (trivially) predictable classical states. In the more general
circumstances the states which commute with HˆSE at one instant will be rotated (into their superpositions)
at a later instant with the evolution generated by the self-Hamiltonian HˆS . Thus, a near-zero entropy
production at one instant may be “paid for” by an enormous entropy production rate a while later. An
example of this situation is afforded by a harmonic oscillator, where the dynamical evolution periodically
“swaps” the state vector between its position and momentum representation, and the two representations
are related to each other by a Fourier transformation. In that case the states which are most immune
to decoherence in the long run turn out to be the fixed points of the “map” defined by the Fourier
transformation. Gaussians are the fixed points of the Fourier transformation (they remain Gaussian).
Hence, coherent states which are unchanged by the Fourier transform are favored by decoherence.11−14
In more general circumstances entropy production may not be minimized by an equally simple set of
states, but the lessons drawn from the two extreme examples discussed above are nevertheless relevant.
In particular, in the case of systems dominated by the environmental interaction, the Hamiltonian HˆSE
will have a major say in selecting the preferred basis, while in the underdamped case of near-reversible
“Newtonian” limit approximately Gaussian wave packets localized in both position and momentum will
be optimally predictable, leading to the idealization of classical trajectories. In either case, einselection
will pinpoint the stable set of states in the Hilbert space. These pointer states will be stable, but their
superpositions will deteriorate into pointer state mixtures rather quickly — on the decoherence timescale
— which tends to happen very much faster than relaxation3.
This eventual diagonality of the density matrix in the einselected basis is a byproduct, an important
symptom, but not the essence of decoherence. I emphasize this because diagonality of ρS in some basis
has been occasionally (mis-) interpreted as a key accomplishment of decoherence. This is misleading.
Any density matrix is diagonal in some basis. This has little bearing on the interpretation. Well-known
examples of such accidental diagonality are the unit density matrix (which is diagonal in every basis) and
the situation where ρA∪B = pρA + (1 − p)ρB describes a union of two ensembles A and B with density
matrices ρA and ρB which are not co-diagonal (i.e., [ρA, ρB] 6= 0). In either of these two cases states which
are on the diagonal of ρA∪B are in effect a mathematical accident and have nothing to do with the physical
reality.
Einselection chooses preferred basis in the Hilbert space in recognition of its predictability. That basis
will be determined by the dynamics of the open system in the presence of environmental monitoring. It
will often turn out that it is overcomplete. Its states may not be orthogonal, and, hence, they would never
follow from the diagonalization of the density matrix.
Einselection guarantees that only those ensembles which consist of a mixture of pointer states can truly
“exist” in the quasi-classical sense. That is, individual members of such ensembles are already immune to
the measurement of pointer observables. These remarks cannot be made about an arbitrary basis which
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happens to diagonalize ρ but are absolutely essential if the quantum system is to be regarded as effectively
classical.
It is useful to contrast decoherence with the more familiar consequence of interactions with the en-
vironment — the noise. Idealized decoherence [e.g., the case of Eq. (5)] has absolutely no effect on the
observable of interest. It is caused by the environment carrying out a continuous “nondemolition measure-
ment” on the pointer observable Oˆ. Thus, decoherence is caused by the system observables effecting the
environment and by the associated transfer of information. Decoherence is, in this sense, a purely quantum
phenomenon; information transfers have no effect on classical states.
Noise, by contrast, is caused by the environment disturbing an observable. It is, of course, familiar in
the classical context. The distinction between the two is illustrated in Fig. 1c, in the c-not language we
have adopted previously.
Astute readers will point out that the distinction between noise and decoherence is a function of the
observable in terms of which c-not is implemented. This is because a quantum c-not is, in contrast with
its classical counterpart, a “two-way street.” When the Hadamard transform, |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2, is
carried out, control and target swap their functions. Thus, loosely speaking, as the information about the
states {|0〉 , |1〉} travels in one direction, the information about the relative phase (which is encoded in their
Hadamard transforms) travels the other way. Thus, in quantum gates the direction of the information flow
depends on the states which are introduced at the input.
Typically, both noise and decoherence are present. One can reinterpret the predictability sieve11 we
have mentioned before as a search for the set of states which maximizes the “control” role of the system,
while simultaneously minimizing its “target” role. Eigenstates of the pointer observable are a solution.
The phases between them are a “victim” of decoherence and are rapidly erased by the interaction with the
environment.
4 PROBABILITIES
The classical textbook of Gnedenko53 distinguishes three ways of defining probability. These are:
(i) Definitions which introduce probability as a quantitative measure of the degree of certainty of the
observer;
(ii) “Standard† definitions”, which originate from the more primitive concept of equal likelihood (and
which can be traced to the original applications of probability in gambling);
(iii) Relative frequency definitions, which attempt to reduce probability to a frequency of occurrence of
an event in a large number of trials.
In the context of the interpretation of quantum theory, the last of these three definitions has been
invoked most often in attempts to derive probabilities from the universal quantum dynamics.54−57 The
argument starts with an ensemble of identical systems (e. g., spin 1
2
system) in a pure state and a definition
of a relative frequency operator for that ensemble. The intended role of the relative frequency operator
was to act as quantum equivalent of a classical “counter,” but in effect it was always a meta-observable of
the whole ensemble, and, thus, it could not have been associated with the outcomes of measurements of
the individual members of the ensemble.
A useful insight into relative frequency observables is afforded by the physically transparent example of
Fahri et al.56 They consider an ensemble of spin 1
2
“magnets,” all in an identical state, aligned with some
†“Classical” is a more often used adjective. We shall replace it by “standard” to avoid confusion with the other kind of
classicality discussed here.
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axis ~a. Relative frequency observable along some other direction ~b would correspond to a measurement
of a deflection of the object with a known mass and with a whole ensemble of spins attached to it by a
(meta) Stern-Gerlach apparatus with a field gradient parallel to ~b. The angle of deflection would be then
proportional to ~a ·~b, and 1+~a·~b
2
would be an eigenvalue of the frequency operator. However, none of the
spins individually would be required to choose its “answer.”
This approach is of interest, as it sheds light on the properties of collective observables in quantum
physics, but it does not lend itself to the required role of supplying the probability interpretation in the
MWI context. A true “frequency” with a classical interpretation cannot be defined at a level which does
not allow “events” — quantum evolutions which lead to objectively existing states — to be associated with
the individual members of that ensemble. This criticism was made already, in somewhat different guise,
by several authors (see Kent57 and references therein). The problem is in part traceable to the fact that
the relative frequency observables do not eliminate superpositions between the branches of the universal
wave function and do not even define what these branches are.
Decoherence has obvious implications for the probability interpretation. The reduced density matrix ρ
which emerges following the interaction with the environment and a partial trace will be always diagonal
in the same basis of einselected pointer states {|i〉}. These states help define elementary “events.” Prob-
abilities of such events can be inferred from their coefficients in ρ, which have the desired “Born’s rule”
form.
Reservations about this straightforward reasoning have been expressed. Zeh58 has noted that interpret-
ing coefficients of the diagonal elements of density matrix as probabilities may be circular. Here we shall
therefore examine this problem more closely and prove operational equivalence of two ensembles — the
original one o associated with the set of identical decohering systems, and an artificial one a, constructed
to have the same density matrix (ρo = ρa), but for a much more classical reason, which allows for a
straightforward interpretation in terms of relative frequencies. This will also shed a light on the sense in
which the origin of quantum probabilities can be associated with the ignorance of observers.
The density matrix alone does not provide a prescription for constructing an ensemble. This is in
contrast with the classical setting, where a probability distribution (i.e., in the phase space) suffices.
However, a density matrix plus a guarantee that the ensemble is a mixture of the pointer states does give
such a prescription. Let us consider ρo along with the einselected set of states {|i〉} which emerge as a
result of the interaction with the environment. We consider an artificially prepared ensemble a with a
density matrix ρa which we make “classical by construction.” Ensemble a consists of systems identical to
the one described by o. They are continuously monitored by an appropriate measuring apparatus which
can interact with and keep records of each system in a.
Let us first focus on the case of pure decoherence. Then, in the einselected basis:
ρo(t = 0) =
∑
i,j
α∗iαj |i〉 〈j| →
∑
i
|αi|2 |i〉 〈i| = ρo(t≫ tD) , (13)
where tD is the decoherence timescale. This very same evolution shall occur for both ρo and ρa. We can
certainly arrange this by adjusting the interactions in the two cases. In particular, the (pointer) states
{|i〉} shall remain untouched by decoherence.
In the artificial case a, the interpretation is inescapable. Each number of a comes with a “certificate”
of its state (which can be found in the memory of the recording device). Following the initial measurement
(which establishes the correlation and the first record), the subsequent records will reveal a very boring
“history” (i.e., |i = 17〉@t1 , |i = 17〉@t2 , . . . |i = 17〉@tn , etc.). Moreover, the observer — any observer — can
remeasure members of a in the basis {|i〉} and count the numbers of outcomes corresponding to distinct
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states of each of N members. There is no “collapse” or “branching” and no need to invoke Born’s rule. All
of the outcomes are in principle pre-determined, as can be eventually verified by comparing the record of
the observer with the on-going record of the monitoring carried out by the measuring devices permanently
attached to the system. Individual systems in a have “certified” states, counting is possible, and, hence,
probability can be arrived at through the frequency interpretation for the density matrix ρa. But, at
the level of density matrices, ρa and ρo are indistinguishable by construction. Moreover, they have the
same pointer states, {|i〉}o = {|i〉}a. Since all the physically relevant elements are identical for o and a,
and since, in a, the frequency interpretation leads to the identification of the coefficients of |i〉 〈i| with
probabilities, the same must be true for the eigenvalues of ρo.
The “ignorance” interpretation of the probabilities in a is also obvious. The state of each and every
system is known, but until the “certificate” for a specific system is consulted, its state shall remain unknown.
Similarly, each system in o can be said to have a state recorded by the environment, waiting to be discovered
by consulting the record dispersed between the environmental degrees of freedom. This statement should
not be taken too far — the environment is only entangled with the system — but it is surprising how
little difference there is between the statements one can make about o and a. In fact, there is surprisingly
little difference between this situation and the case where the system is completely classical. Consider
the familiar Szilard’s engine,59 where the observer (Szilard’s demon) makes a measurement of a location
of a classical particle. The correlation between the particle and the records of the demon can be undone
(until or when demon’s record is copied). Thus, “collapse” may not be as purely quantum as it is usually
supposed. And information transfer is at the heart of the issue in both classical and quantum contexts.
In any case, our goal here has been a frequentist justification of probabilities. And that goal we have
accomplished using a very different approach than these based on the frequency operator attempts to
derive Born’s formula put forward to date.54−57
To apply the strategy of the standard definition of probabilities in quantum physics, we must identify
circumstances under which possibilities — mutually exclusive “events” — can be permuted without having
any noticeable effect on their likelihoods. We shall start with the decoherent density matrix which has all
of the diagonal coefficients equal:
ρ = N−1
N∑
k=1
|k〉 〈k| = 1 (14)
Exchanging any two k’s has obviously no effect on ρ and, therefore, on the possible measurement outcomes.
Thus, when we assume that the total probability is normalized and equal to unity, a probability of any
individual outcome |k〉 must be given by:
Trρ |k〉 〈k| = N−1 . (15)
It also follows that a probability of a combination of several (n) such elementary events is
Trρ (|k1〉 〈k1|+ |k2〉 〈k2|+ · · ·+ |kn〉 〈kn|) = n/N . (16)
Moreover, when before the onset of decoherence the system was described by the state vector
|ψ〉 = N−1/2
N∑
k=1
eiφk |k〉 , (17)
the probabilities of the alternatives after decoherence in the basis {|k〉} will be
p|k〉 = |〈k|ψ〉|2 = N−1 . (18)
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However, in order to be able to add or to permute different alternatives without any operational implica-
tions, we must have assumed decoherence. For, as long as |ψ〉 is a superposition, Eq. (17), one can easily
invent permutations which will effect measurement outcomes. Consider, for example,
|ψ〉 = (|1〉+ |2〉 − |3〉) /
√
3 (19)
A measurement could involve alternatives {|1〉 , |2〉+ |3〉 , |2〉 − |3〉} and would easily distinguish between
the |ψ〉 above and the permuted:
|ψ′〉 = (|3〉+ |2〉 − |1〉) /
√
3 (20)
The difference between |ψ〉 and |ψ′〉 is the relative phase. Thus, decoherence and a preferred basis with
identical coefficients are both required to implement the standard definition in the quantum context.
The case of unequal probabilities is dealt with by reducing it to (or at least approximating it with) the
case of equal probabilities. Consider a density matrix of the system
ρS =
N∑
k=1
pk |k〉 〈k| . (21)
We note that it can be regarded as an average of an equal probability density matrix of a composite system
consisting of S and R.
ρSR ∼=
N∑
k=1
nk+1−1∑
j=nk
|k, j〉 〈k, j| /M (22)
Here M is the total number of states in HSR, and the degeneracies nk are selected so that pk ≃ nk/M , i.e.,
nk ∼=
k∑
k′=1
pk′ ·M ,
N∑
k=1
nk =M . (23)
For sufficiently large M (typically M ≫ N) “coarse-grained” ρ˜S and ρS will become almost identical;
ρ˜S = lim
M
N
→∞
N∑
k=1
nk+1−1∑
j=nk
〈j| ρSR |j〉 = lim
M
N
→∞
TrRρSR = ρS (24)
One can now use the “standard” argument to obtain, first, the probability interpretation for ρSR (based on
the invariance of ρSR under the permutations (kj)↔ (k′j′)), and then use it [and Eq. (16)] to deduce the
probabilistic interpretation of ρS . Note that in the above sum, Eq. (24), we did not have to appeal to the
actual numerical values of the eigenvalues of ρSR, but only to their equivalence under the permutations.
Thus, we are not assuming a probabilistic interpretation of ρSR to derive it for ρS . (We also note that
the sum over auxilliary states above is, strictly speaking, not a conventional trace since the dimensions
of subspaces traced out for distinct k’s will in general differ. For those concerned with such matters we
point out that one can deal with subspaces of equal dimensionality providing that the “dimension deficit”
is made up by auxilliary states which have zero probability.)
This completes the second approach to the quantum probabilities. Again, we have reduced the problem
to counting. This time, it was a count of equivalent alternatives (rather than of events). In both of these
approaches decoherence played an important role. In the standard definition, decoherence got rid of the
distinguishability of the permuted configurations and einselection defined what they were. In the frequency
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interpretation einselection was essential — it singled out states which were stable enough to be counted
and verified.
Our last approach starts from a point of departure which does not rely on counting. Gnedenko was least
sympathetic to the definitions of probability as a measure of a “degree of certainty,” which he regarded
as a “branch of psychology” rather than a foundation of a branch of mathematics. We shall also find our
attempt in this direction least concrete of the three, but some of the steps are nevertheless worth sketching.
Gnedenko’s discomfort with the “degree of certainty” might have been alleviated if he had been familiar
with the paper of Cox60 who has, in effect, derived basic formulae of the theory of probability starting
from such a seemingly subjective foundation by insisting that the “measure” should be consistent with the
laws of Boolean logic.
Intuitively, this is a very appealing demand. Probability emerges as an extension of the two-valued
logic into a continuum of the “degrees of certainty.” The assumption that one should be able to carry
classical reasoning concerning “events” and get consistent estimates of the conditional degree of certainty
leads to algebraic rules which must be followed by the measure of the degree of certainty.
This implies that an information processing observer who employs classical logic states and classical
memory states which do not interfere will be forced to adopt calculus of probabilities essentially identical
to what we have grown accustomed to. In particular, likelihood of c and b (i.e., “proposition c · b”) will
obey a multiplication theorem:
µ (c · b|a) = µ (c|b · a)µ (b|a) . (25)
Above µ(b|a) designates a conditional likelihood of b given that a is certain. Moreover, µ should be
normalized:
µ (a|b) + µ (∼ a|b) = 1 , (26)
where ∼ a is the negation of the proposition a. Finally, likelihood of c or b (c ∪ b) is:
µ (c ∪ b|a) = µ(c|a) + µ(b|a)− µ(c · b|a) , (27)
which is the ordinary rule for the probability that at least one of two events will occur.
In short, if classical Boolean logic is valid, then the ordinary probability theory follows. We are
halfway through our argument, as we have not yet established the connection between the µ’s and the
state vectors. But it is important to point out that the assumption of the validity of Boolean logic in the
derivation involving quantum theory is nontrivial. As was recognized by Birkhoff and von Neumann,61 the
distributive law a · (b∪ c) = (a · b)∪ (a · c) is not valid for quantum systems. Without this law, the rule for
the likelihood of the logical sum of alternatives, Eqs. (26), (27) would not have held. The physical culprit
is quantum interference, which, indeed, invalidates probability sum rules (as is well appreciated in the
examples such as the double slit experiment). Decoherence destroys interference between the einselected
states. Thus, with decoherence, Boolean logic, and, consequently, classical probability calculus with its
sum rules are recovered.
Once it is established that “likelihood” must be a measure (which, in practice, means that µ is non-
negative, normalized, satisfies sum rules, and that it depends only on the state of the system and on the
proposition) Gleason’s theorem62 implies that
µ(a|b) = Tr (|a〉 〈a| ρb) , (28)
where ρb is a density matrix of the system, and |a〉 〈a| is a projection operator corresponding to the
proposition a. Thus, starting from an assumption about the validity of classical logic (i.e., absence of
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interference) we have arrived, first, at the sum rule for probabilities and, subsequently, at the Born’s
formula.
Of the three approaches outlined in this section the two “traditional” are more direct and — at least
to this author — more convincing. The last one is of interest more for its connection between logic and
probability than as a physically compelling derivation of probabilities. We have described it in that spirit.
These sorts of logical considerations have played an important part in the motivation and the subsequent
development of the “consistent histories” approach.18−20
5 RELATIVELY OBJECTIVE EXISTENCE: IN WHAT SENSE
IS THE MOON THERE WHEN NOBODY LOOKS?
The subjective nature of quantum states is at the heart of the interpretational dilemmas of quantum
theory. It seems difficult to comprehend how quantum fuzziness could lead to the hard classical reality
of our everyday experience. A state of a classical system can be in principle measured without being
perturbed by an observer who knew nothing about it beforehand. Hence, it is said that classical physics
allows states to exist objectively. Operationally, when observer A prepares a classical ensemble ac and hides
the list LcA with the records of the state of each system in ac from the observer B, it will be still possible
for B to find out the states of each member of ac through a measurement, with no a priori knowledge.
To verify this, B could supply his list LcB for inspection. Classical physics allows LcA and LcB to be always
identical. Moreover, both lists will be the same as the new list Lc′A with the states of ac remeasured by A
to make sure that ac was not perturbed by B’s measurements. Indeed, it is impossible for A to find out,
just by monitoring the systems in ensemble ac, whether some enterprising and curious B has discovered all
that is to know about ac. Measurements carried out on a classical ac can be accomplished without leaving
an imprint.
This gedankenexperiment shall be the criterion for the “objective existence.” When all of the relevant
lists match, we shall take it as operational evidence for the “objective nature of measured states.” In the
case of a quantum ensemble aq this experiment cannot succeed when it is carried out on a closed system.
Observer A can of course prepare his list LqA — a list of Hilbert space states of all the systems in aq.
B could attempt to discover what these states are, but in the absence of any prior knowledge about the
observable selected by A in the preparation of aq he will fail — he will reprepare members of aq in the
eigenstates of the observables he has selected. Hence, unless by sheer luck B has elected to measure the
same observables as A for each member of aq, LqA and LqB will not match. Moreover, when A remeasures
the quantum ensemble using his “old” observables (in the Heisenberg picture, if necessary) following the
measurement carried out by B, he will discover that his new list Lq′A and his old list LqA do not match
either. This illustrates the sense in which states of quantum systems are subjective — they are inevitably
shaped by measurements. In a closed quantum system it is impossible to just “find out” what the state
is. Asking a question (choosing the to-be-measured observable) guarantees that the answer (its eigenstate)
will be consistent with the question posed.51
Before proceeding, we note that in the above discussions we have used a “shorthand” to describe the
course of events. What was really taking place should have been properly described in the language of cor-
relations. Thus, especially in the quantum case, the objectivity criterion concerned the correlation between
a set of several lists (LqA, LqB, Lq
′
A) which were presumably imprinted in effectively classical (i.e., einselected
with the help of appropriate environment) sets of record states. The states of the systems in the ensemble
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aq played a role similar to the communication channels. The operational definition of objective existence of
the state of the system hinges on the ability of the state of the system to serve as a “template,” which can
remain unperturbed while it is being imprinted onto the records of the initially ignorant observers. States
of isolated quantum systems cannot serve this purpose — they are too malleable! (Energy eigenstates
are somewhat of an exception, but that is a different story (Paz and Zurek, in preparation).) We shall
see below that the einselected states of decohering quantum systems are less fragile and can be used as a
“template”. Again, we shall use a shorthand, talking about states, while the real story is played out at
the level of multipartite correlations. We assume the reader shall continue to translate the shorthand into
the “full version.”
Consider ae, an ensemble of quantum systems subject to ideal einselection caused by the interaction
with the environment. If the systems are to retain their states in spite of decoherence, the observer A has
very little choice in the observables he can use for preparation. The menu of stable correlations between
the states of systems in ae and his records is limited to these involving einselected pointer states. Only
such states will be preserved by the environment for periods of time long enough to contemplate the
gedankenexperiment described above.
The task of the observer B (who is trying to become correlated with the stable states of ae without
destroying pre-existing stable correlations established by the observer A) is simplified. As soon as he finds
out what are the pointer observables, he can measure at will. He can be sure that – in order to get sets
of records with predictive power – A must have selected the same pointer observables to prepare ae. And
as soon as the pointer observables are known, their eigenstates can be found without being perturbed.
Moreover, B will be measuring observables which are already being monitored by the environment, so his
measurements will have no discernible effect on the states of the systems in ae.
Hence, either A was smart enough to choose pointer states (in which case his lists LeA, Le′A, . . . will all be
identical) and B’s spying will not be detected, or A chooses to measure and prepare arbitrary states in the
Hilbert space, guaranteeing their deterioration into mixtures of pointer states at a rapid decoherence rate.
In this second case A’s lists will reflect a steady increase of entropy caused by the mismatch between the
observable he has elected to measure and the pointer observables he should have measured. And B’s spying
will most likely still be undetected (especially if he is smart enough to focus on the pointer observables).
Let us now compare the three variants of the gedankenexperiment above. In the classical case, anyone
can find out states of the systems in ac without perturbing them. Prior information is unnecessary, but
only classical (i.e., localized, etc.) states can be used. In the case of a quantum isolated system an
enormous variety of quantum states — including all conceivable superpositions of the classical states —
can be prepared by A in aq. Now B’s measurement will almost inevitably reprepare these states, unless
somehow B knows beforehand what to measure (i.e., what observables has A measured). In the third case
— quantum, but with decoherence and einselection — the choices of A are limited to the preferred pointer
states. Only a very small subset of all the superpositions in the Hilbert space H is available. Moreover, the
environment is already carrying out continuous monitoring of the observables it has elected to “measure.”
B can use the correlations established between the system and the state of the environment to find out
what are the preferred observables and to measure them. He will of course discover that his list matches
A’s lists and that A could not have detected B’s “spying.”
When the states can be “revealed” without being reprepared in the process, they can be thought to
exist objectively. Both the classical case and the quantum plus einselection case share this feature. The
environment-induced superselection simultaneously decreases the number of states in H while allowing the
einselected states to “exist objectively” — to be found out without the necessity of repreparing them in
the process.
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In fact, the measurements we carry out as observers are taking an even more immediate advantage
of the monitoring carried out by the environment. Our measurements are almost never direct — nearly
without exception they rely on interception of the information already present in the environment. For
instance, all of the visual information we acquire comes from a tiny fraction of the photon environment
intercepted by the rod and cone cells in our eyes. Indeed, this is perhaps the best strategy observer B could
have used in the third version of the gedankenexperiment above. Rather than directly interacting with the
system in ae, he could have monitored the environment. An imprint left in a small fraction of its state
is usually enough to determine the state of the system — the environment contains a vastly redundant
record of the pointer observables.28 Thus, perception of classical reality seems inevitable for the observers
who — like us — rely on the second-hand information, on the correlations acquired indirectly, from the
environment.
In a sense the environment plays the role of a commonly accessible “internet–like” data base which
allowes one to make copies of the records concerning the state of the system. There is no need to measure
the system directly — it suffices to consult the relevant “web page”. And there is no danger of altering
the state of the system: Nonseparability and other such manifestations of quantum theory could reappear
only if, somehow, all of the widely disseminated copies of the information were captured and processed in
the appropriate (quantum) manner. The difficulty of such an enterprise in the macroscopic domain (which
we have quantified before by the redundancy distance, Eqs. (6)-(12)) is a measure of irreversibility of the
decoherence–induced “reduction of the wavepacket”.
We have just established that states of quantum systems interacting with their environments exist
much like the classical states were presumed to exist. They can be revealed by measurements of the pointer
observables which can be ascertained without prior knowledge. In particular, indirect measurements —
observes monitoring the environment in search of the imprints of the state of the system — seem to be
the safest and at the same time most realistic way to reveal that state. Moreover, there are many fewer
possible einselected states than there are states in the Hilbert space. Thus, the relative objectivity based
on the system-environment correlations and, hence, on decoherence and einselection, comes at a price: The
choice is severely limited.‡
In the above operational approach to the definition of existence, we have made several simplifying
assumptions. We have (i) neglected the evolution; (ii) assumed perfect decoherence, and; (iii) focused on
observers with “perfect knowledge,” i.e., used pure states rather than mixtures as initial conditions. All of
these assumptions can be relaxed with relatively little pain. Hamiltonian evolution alone would not be a
problem — the system could be described in Heisenberg’s picture. But the combination of evolution and
decoherence will lead to complications, resulting in a preferred basis which is imperfect12−14,17 — even the
optimal pointer states would eventually deteriorate into mixtures, albeit on a timescale long compared to
‡How limited? There are of course infinitely many superpositions in H of finite dimensionality, but that is already true of
a spin 1
2
Hilbert space, and it does not capture the reason for the incredible proliferation of superpositions. In the Hilbert
space of a decohering system, there will be N ∼ Dim(H) pointer states {|k〉}. For a typical superposition state |ψ〉 composed
of all N states, with the possibilities “coarse grained” by assuming that all |ψ〉 have a form:
|ψ〉 = 1√
N
∑
k
(−)ik |k〉
where ik is 0 or 1, there will be
W ∼ 2N
such superpositions. That is, even when we set all the coefficients to have the same absolute value, and coarse-grain phases
to the least significant (binary) digit, we will have exponentially many possibilities.
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the decoherence timescale for random superposition in H.
This difference between the einselected states and arbitrary superpositions could be quantified by
defining the predictability horizon:
tp =
∞∫
0
(HEQ −H(t)) dt/ (HEQ −H(0)) (29)
This characterizes the timescale over which the initial information HEQ−H(0) is lost as the von Neumann
entropy, H(ρ) = −Trρ log ρ, approaches the long-term (equilibrium) value HEQ. Easier to compute (and
similarly motivated)
t′p =
∞∫
0
Tr
(
ρ2t − ρ2(∞)
)
dt (30)
should supply equivalent information. Thus t′p would be short (and of the order of the decoherence
time) for a typical initial state in the Hilbert space. By contrast, the predictability horizon may be long
(and, perhaps, even infinite) for pointer states of integrable systems, while for chaotic systems one would
anticipate predictability timescales determined by the Lyapunov exponents when decoherence dominates.24
The gedankenexperiment at the foundation of our “operational definition of existence” is based on the
comparison of records of two observers A and B. It could now be repeated, provided that the duration of
the experiment is brief compared to the predictability timescale, or that the natural rate of information
loss is accounted for when evaluating the final results.
In fact, the predictability sieve could be implemented using this strategy. Einselected pure states will
maximize tp. Moreover, such procedure based on the predictability timescale can be easily applied to
compare pure and mixed states. That is, one can find out how much more durable are various correlations
between the observer’s records of the coarse-grained measurements. The key difference from the original
predictability sieve,11 which has been successfully used to demonstrate the special role of Gaussians,11−14
is a somewhat different sieve criterion, which may even have certain advantages.
All these caveats and technicalities should not obscure the central point of our discussion. Environment-
induced superselection allows observers to anticipate what states in the Hilbert space have a “relatively
objective existence” and can be revealed by measurements without being simultaneously reprepared. Rel-
atively objective existence is a deliberate double entendre, trying to point out both the relative manner in
which existence is defined (i.e., through correlations, similar in spirit to the relative states of Everett50)
and a reminder that the existence is not absolutely stable but, rather, that it is purchased at the price of
decoherence and based on the monitoring by the environment.
Concerns about the predictability timescale do not imply that, on timescales long compared to tp, the
states of the systems in question do not “exist.” Rather, tp indicates the predictability horizon on which
evolution and decoherence destroy the relevance of the “old” data (the record-state correlation). But even
then the essence of our definition of reality — the ability of the observer to “reveal” the state — captures
the essence of “existence.”
6 THE EXISTENTIAL INTERPRETATION
The interpretation based on the ideas of decoherence and einselection has not really been spelled out
to date in any detail. I have made a few half-hearted attempts in this direction,11,63 but, frankly, I was
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hoping to postpone this task, since the ultimate questions tend to involve such “anthropic” attributes of the
“observership” as “perception,” “awareness,” or “consciousness,” which, at present, cannot be modelled
with a desirable degree of rigor.
It was my hope that one would be able to point to the fact that decoherence and einselection allow for
existence (as defined operationally through relative states and correlations in the preceding section) and
let those with more courage than I worry about more esoteric matters. I have been gradually changing
my mind as a result of penetrating questions of my colleagues and the extrapolations (attempted by the
others) of the consequences of decoherence and einselection which veered in the directions quite different
from the one I have anticipated. (See references 64–67 for a sample of questions, criticisms, and attempts
at an interpretation.) Moreover, while there are “deep” questions which may be too ambiguous to attack
with the tools used by physicists, there are aspects of information processing which bear direct relevance for
these deeper issues, and which can be profitably analysed in a reasonably concrete setting. Here I intend
to amplify some of the points I have made before and to provide the “next iteration” by investigating
consequences of environmental monitoring a step or two beyond the operational definition of “existence.”
I shall proceed in the general direction indicated earlier,11,63 and focus on the stability of the einselected
correlations.
We start by noting that the relatively objective existence of certain states “negotiated” with the envi-
ronment has significant consequences for the observers and their information-processing abilities. In the
gedankenexperiments involving observers A and B in the preceding section we could have equally well
argued for the objective existence of the states of their memory cells. Again, superpositions of all the
possibilities are ruled out by einselection, and the brain of an observer can preserve, for long periods of
time, only the pointer states of its neurons. These states exist in the same relatively objective sense we
have defined before — they can be revealed (correlated with) the states of other neurons without having to
be simultaneously re-prepared. Indeed, real neurons are coupled very strongly to their environments and
certainly cannot exist in superpositions. Their two stables states are characterized by different rates of
firing, each a consequence of a nonequilibrium dissipation-dominated phenomena, which are bound to leave
a very strong imprint on the environmental degrees of freedom not directly involved in the information
processing. In an obviously overdamped system operating at a relatively high temperature, the inability
to maintain superpositions is not a surprise.§
When we assume, as seems reasonable, that the states of neurons are the “seat” of memory and that
their interactions lead to information processing (which eventually results in “awareness,” and other such
“higher functions”), we have tangible hardware issues to analyze. Indeed, at this level of discussion there
is little fundamental difference between a brain and a massively parallel, neural network–like, effectively
classical computer.
The ability to process information concerning states of objects external to memory (for, say, the purpose
of prediction) is then based on the stable existence of correlations between the record bits of memory and
the state of the object. It is fairly easy to imagine how such a correlation can be initially established
either by a direct measurement or, as we have noted previously, through an indirect process involving
environment. For the reliability of memories, it is absolutely crucial that this correlation be immune to
further correlations with the environment, i.e., to decoherence. Following a measurement (and the initial
§Neurons work more like a diode or a transistor, relying on two stable steady states (characterized by different firing
rates) for stability of the logical “0” and “1,” rather than the two-state spin 1
2
-like systems, which often end up playing the
neuron’s roles in models of neuron networks invented by theoretical physicists. I believe, however, that for the purpose of
the ensuing discussion this distinction is not essential and I will continue to invoke licentia physica theoretica and consider
spin 1
2
-like neurons for the remainder of this paper.
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bout of decoherence), the reduced joint density matrix of the system and the relevant part of memory and
the environment will have the form:
ρSM =
∑
i
pi |si〉 〈si| |µi〉 〈µi| (31)
The predictability horizon can be defined as before through
t(i)p =
∞∫
p
(H(si, µi; t)−H(si, µi;∞)) dt
H(si, µi; 0)−H(si, µi;∞) (32)
for individual outcomes. Here H can stand for either Shannon-von Neumann, or linear (or still other) mea-
sure of information content of the conditional (re-) normalized 〈µi |ρSM|µi〉. After a perfect measurement
there is a one-to-one correlation between the outcome and the record (Eq. (31)). It will, however, deterio-
rate with time as a result of dynamics and the openness of the system, even if the record–keeping memory
states are perfectly reliable.68 The predictability timescale for memory-system joint density matrices has
a more specific interpretation than the one defined by Eqs. (29) and (30). It is also safe to assume that
memories use stable states to preserve records. In this “no amnesia” case, t(i)p will measure the timescale
on which the acquired information is becoming a useless “old news” because of the unpredictable evolution
of the open system. Predictability horizon can (and typically will) depend on the outcome.
We note that more often than not, both the states of memory and the states of the measured systems
will be mixed, coarse-grained states inhabiting parts of large Hilbert spaces, rather than pure states. Thus
the record µi will correspond to ρµi and Tr(ρµiρµj )
∼= δij . It is straightforward to generalize Eqs. (31)
and (32) to cover this more realistic case. Indeed, it is likely that the memory states will be redundant, so
that the likely perturbations to the “legal” memory states shall retain orthogonality. This would allow for
classical error correction, such as is known to be implemented, for example, in neural circuits responsible
for photodetection in mammalian eyes, where several (approximately seven) rods must fire more or less
simultaneously to result in a record of detection of a light source.
Observers will be able to make accurate predictions for as long as a probabilistic equivalent of logical
implication shall be valid, that is, as long as the conditional probability g(t) defined by:
p (σi(t)|µi) = p (σi(t), µi) /p(µi) = g(t) (33)
is close to unity. Here σi(t) is a “proposition” about the state of the system at a time t. One example
of such a formal equivalent of a proposition would be a projection operator onto a subspace of a Hilbert
space. When σi(t) is taken to be a pure state |si(t)〉, and t ≪ t(i)p so that g(t) ∼= 1, Eq. (33) becomes
in effect a formal statement of the “collapse” axiom of quantum measurement theory. For, memory will
continue to rediscover the system in the same state upon repeated re-measurements.
Again — as in the preceding section — relatively objective existence of correlations (established in
contact with the environment, with their stability purchased at the expense of the limitation of the possible
states of memory and the measured system) is decisive for the predictive utility of the records. These
records must be repeatedly and reliably accessible for the other parts of memory to allow for information
processing. This is why the record states which exist (at least in the relatively objective operational sense
employed before) are essential for the reliability of memories inscribed in open systems. They can be re-
measured by the other memory cells spreading the useful correlation throughout the information processing
network of logical gates but suffer no ill effects in the process.
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The record state |µi〉 must then obviously be decoherence resistant, but the same should be true for
the measured states |si(0)〉 and (hopefully) for their near-future descendants |si(t)〉. Only then will the
correlation between memory and the state of the system be useful for the purpose of predictions. One can
analyze this persistence of quasi-classical correlations from various points of view, including the algorithmic
information content one. We shall mention this idea here only briefly as a more complete account is
already available.68 In essence, when |si(t)〉 evolves predictably, a sequence of repeated measurements of
the appropriate observables yields a composite record R = {µ(1)@t1 , µ(2)@t2 , ..., µ(n)@tn}, which will be all derivable
from the initial µ
(0)
@t0
and from the algorithm for the evolution of the monitored system. This predictability
could be expressed from the viewpoint of the observer by comparing the algorithmic information content
of R with its size in bits. When the whole R can be computed from the initial condition, the algorithmic
information content K(R) (defined as the size of the shortest program for a universal computer with the
output R69) is much less than the size of the “uncompressed” R in bits. An illustrative (if boring) example
of this would be a sequence of records of a fixed state of an object such as a stone. Then R would simply
be the same record, repeated over and over. This is of course trivially algorithmically compressible.
This immobility of objects such as stones is the basic property which, when reflected in the perfectly
predictable sequence of records, provides a defining example of (the most basic type of) perception of exis-
tence, of permanence which defines “classical reality”. In this case, the same set of observables “watched”
by the environment is also being watched by the observer.
In general, the state of a system evolving in contact with the environment will become less and less
closely correlated with its initial state. Therefore, entropy will increase, and the reliability of the implication
measured by the conditional probability p(σi(t)|µi) will decrease. Alternatively, one may want to retain the
safety of predictions (i.e., have p(σi(t)|µi) close to unity at the price of decreased accuracy). This could be
accomplished by choosing a safer (but less precise) prediction σ˜i(t) which includes σi(t) with some “error
margin” and thus supplies the requisite redundancy.
For a judiciously selected initial measurement the conditional probability p(σi(t)|µi) will decrease rel-
atively slowly (for example, on a dynamically determined Lyapunov timescale in the case of chaotic
systems68), while for measurements which result in the preparation of a “wrong” initial condition — a state
at odds with einselection — the conditional probability would diminish suddenly, on a near-instantaneous
decoherence timescale.
Typically, the prediction σi will not be a pure state but a suitably macroscopic patch in the phase space
(and a corresponding “chunk” of the Hilbert space). Increase in the size of the patch will help extend the
relative longevity of the predictive power of the records at the expense of the accuracy. Nevertheless, even
in this case predictive power of the old records shall eventually be lost with time.
The memory must be stored in robust record states, which will persist (ideally forever, or, at least,
until they are deliberately erased). Deliberate erasure is an obvious strategy when the records outlive their
usefulness.
In this picture of a network of effectively classical memory elements interconnected with logical gates,
stability of the records is essential. It is purchased at the price of “censorship” of the vast majority of
all of the superpositions which are in principle available in the Hilbert space. It is in an obvious contrast
with quantum computers,30−35 where all of the superpositions are available for information processing. and
where the states of memory are unstable and prone to the environment-induced decoherence and other
errors.
Let us now consider how such a quasi-classical, environmentally stable memory “perceives” the Universe.
To avoid generalities, we consider — from the point of view of this memory — the task of determining
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what are the classical branches of the universal state vector. That is, we shall ask the observer to find out
what are the pointer states in his branch of the Universe.
In effect, we have already presented all of the elements necessary for the definition of the branches in
the course of the discussion of existence in the preceding section. A branch is defined by its predictability
— by the fact that the correlations between its state and the records of the observer are stable. In other
words, a branch is defined by the fact that it does not split into branches as rapidly as a randomly selected
state.
The observer is “attached” to the branch by the correlations between its state and the einselected
states which characterize the branch. Indeed, the observer is a part of his branch. In the case of perfect
predictability (no entropy production; initial records of the observer completely determine the future
development of the branch), there would be no further branching. An observer will then be able — on
the basis of his perfect predictability — to develop a view that the evolution of the Universe is completely
deterministic and that his measurements either confirm perfect predictability (when carried out on the
system he has already measured in the past) or that they help reveal the pre-existing state of affairs within
“his” branch.
This classically motivated and based on Newtonian intuitions “single branch” (single trajectory) limit
of quantum physics is responsible for the illusion that we live in a completely classical Universe. It is
an excellent approximation in the realm of the macroscopic, but it begins to fail as the resolution of the
measurements increases. One example of failure is supplied by quantum measurements and, more generally,
by the situations where the state of the macroscopic object is influenced by the state of a quantum object.
Then the past initial condition is exhaustive — the observer knows a pure state, i.e., all that is possible to
know — and yet this is demonstrably insufficient to let him determine the future development of his branch.
For, when the past correlation is established in a basis incompatible either with the monitoring carried out
by the environment, or when it prepares a state which is not an eigenstate of the new measurement, the
new outcome cannot be inferred from the old initial condition.
Relatively objective existence is at the core of the definition of branches. Stability of the correlations
between the state of the observer and the branch is responsible for the perception of classicality. Stability
of the record states of the observer is an obvious precondition. The observer with a given set of records
is firmly attached to the branch which has induced these records — he “hangs on” to the branch by the
correlations. He may even be regarded as a part of that branch, since mutual correlations between systems
define branches.
Observers described here are quite different from the aloof observers of classical physics, which sim-
ply “note” outcomes of their measurements by adding to their abstract and immaterial repository of
information. In a quantum universe information is physical70 — there is simply no information without
representation.63 In our context this implies that an observer who has recorded one of the potential out-
comes is physically distinct from an observer who has detected an alternative outcome. Moreover, these
two states of the observer are objectively different — they can be “revealed” from the outside (i.e., by
monitoring the environment in which record states are immersed) without disturbing the observer’s records.
The question “why don’t we perceive superpositions” (which has been repeated also by some of those
who investigate and support ideas of decoherence71) has a straightforward answer. The very physical
state of the observer and, thus, his identity is a reflection of the information he has acquired. Hence, the
acquisition of information is not some abstract, physically insignificant act, but a cause of reshaping of the
state of the observer. An exaggerated example is afforded by the famous case of Schro¨dinger’s cat.48 A cat
that dies as the result of an amplified quantum event will certainly be easily distinguishable from the cat
that lives on (and can continue observations). Similarly, an effectively classical computer playing the role
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of an observer will be measurably distinct depending on what outcome was recorded in its data bank.
Coherent superpositions of two memory states will disappear on the decoherence timescale in the
presence of the environment. Hence, a coherent superposition of two distinct identities of an observer
does not exist in the relatively objective operational sense introduced previously. Even in the rare cases
when a memory bit of an observer enters into a bona fide entanglement with an isolated quantum system,
decoherence will intervene and turn that entanglement into an ordinary classical correlation in the basis
defined by the einselected record states.
The interpretation which recognizes that decoherence and environment-induced superselection allow
for the existence of states at the expense of the superposition principle is known as the existential
interpretation.11,63 It accounts for the inability of the observers to “perceive” arbitrary superpositions.
The (relatively) objective existence of the records is a precondition for their classical processing and,
therefore, for perception.¶
It is easy to design logical states which would distinguish between objectively existing records and
accidental states. Redundancy is the key. Thus, when an entanglement between a (two-state) system and
a memory cell develops,
|φSµ〉 = α |↑〉 |1〉+ β |↓〉 |0〉 , (34)
and, under the influence of the environmental decoherence, rapidly deteriorates to a classical correlation
ρSµ = |α|2 |↑〉 〈↑| |↑〉 〈1|+ |β|2 |↓〉 〈↓| |0〉 〈0| , (35)
the reliability of the record state in an arbitrary basis can be in principle tested by the other parts of the
memory. Repeated measurements of the same memory cell in different bases and comparing longevity of
the state in the {|0〉 , |1〉} basis with the (lack of) longevity of the state in the {|+〉 , |−〉} basis would do
the trick. Thus, as a consequence of decoherence and einselection,
ρSM = |α|2 |↑〉 〈↑| |1〉 〈1| |1′〉 〈1′| |1′′〉 〈1′′| . . .
+ |β|2 |↓〉 〈↓| |0〉 〈0| |0′〉 〈0′| |0′′〉 〈0′′| . . . , (36)
in the transparent notation, while in the case of measurements of {|+〉 , |−〉} record states there would
be no correlation between the consecutive measurements carried out at intervals exceeding decoherence
timescale. Instead of two branches of Eq. (36), there would be 2N branches, where N is the number of two-
state memory cells implicated. And a typical branch would be algorithmically random, easily betraying
unreliability of the {|+〉 , |−〉} record states.
This simplistic model has no pretense to realism. Rather, its aim is to demonstrate a strategy for
testing what is reliably known by the observer. A slightly more realistic model would entail redundant
records we have mentioned already, Eqs. (6)-(12). Thus, the initial correlations would involve several (n)
memory cells:
ρSµn = |α|2 |↑〉 〈↑| |1〉 〈1|1 |1〉 〈1|2 . . . |1〉 〈1|n
+ |β|2 |↓〉 〈↓| |0〉 〈0|1 |0〉 〈0|2 . . . |0〉 〈0|n ; . (37)
Then the reliability of the records can be tested by looking for the basis in which all of the records are in
accord. This can be accomplished without destruction of all of the original redundant correlation between
some of the records and the system.
¶It is amusing to speculate that a truly quantum observer (i.e., an observer processing quantum information in a quantum
computer-like fashion) might be able to perceive superpositions of branches which are inaccessible to us, beings limited in
our information processing strategies to the record states “censored” by einselection.
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These toy models establish that, in the presence of decoherence, it is possible to record and that it is
possible to find out what information is reliable (which correlations are immune to decoherence). Again, we
emphasize that the above toy models have no pretense to even a remote kinship with real-world observers.‖
7 CONCLUSION
What we have described above is a fairly complete sketch of the physics involved in the transition from quan-
tum to classical. Whether one would now claim that the emerging picture fits better Bohr’s “Copenhagen”
framework or Everett’s “Many Worlds” interpretation seems to be a semantic rather than a substantial
issue. To begin with, decoherence was not a part of either of these interpretations. Thus, what we have
presented here is clearly beyond either CI or MWI.
The existential interpretation owes Bohr the central question which was always implicit in the early
discussions. This question — about the location of the quantum-classical border — is really very similar to
questions about “existence.” We have posed and settled these questions operationally and, thus, provided
a quantum justification for some of the original CI program.
On the other hand, we owe Everett the observation that quantum theory should be the key tool in
the search for its interpretation. The question and concern may be traced to Bohr, but the language of
branches and the absence of explicit collapses and ab initio classicality are very much in tune with MWI.
We believe that the point of view based on decoherence settles many of the questions which were left
open by MWI and CI. This includes the origin of probabilities as well as the emergence of “objective
existence”, although more needs to be done.
In particular, one issue which has been often taken for granted is looming big, as a foundation of the
whole decoherence program. It is the question of what are the “systems” which play such a crucial role in
all the discussions of the emergent classicality. This issue was raised earlier,2,28 but the progress to date has
been slow at best. Moreover, replacing “systems” with, say, “coarse grainings” does not seem to help at all
— we have at least tangible evidence of the objectivity of the existence of systems, while coarse-grainings
are completely “in the eye of the observer.”
It should be emphasized that reliance on systems does not undermine the progress achieved to date
in the study of the role of decoherence and einselection. As noted before,11 the problem of measurement
cannot be even stated without a recognition of the existence of systems. Therefore, our appeal to the
same assumption for its resolution is no sin. However, a compelling explanation of what are the systems
— how to define them given, say, the overall Hamiltonian in some suitably large Hilbert space — would
be undoubtedly most useful.
I would like to thank Chris Jarzynski, Michael Nielsen, and Chris Zalka for comments on the manuscript.
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Fig. 1. Information transfer in measurements and in decoherence.
a) Controlled not (c-not) as an elementary bit-by-bit measurement. Its action is described by the “truth
table” according to which the state of the target bit (apparatus memory in the quantum measurement
vocabulary) is “flipped” when the control bit (measured system) is |1 > and untouched when it is |0 >
(Eq. (2)). This can be accomplished by the unitary Schro¨dinger evolution (see, Refs. 1, 28, or 31 for the
information theoretic discussion).
b) Decoherence process “caricatured” by means of c-nots. Pointer state of the apparatus (and, formerly,
target bit in the pre-measurement, Fig. 1a) now acts as a control in the continuous monitoring by the
c-nots of the environment. This continuous monitoring process is symbolically “discretized” here into a
sequence of c-nots, with the state of the environment assuming the role of the multi-bit target. Monitored
observable of the apparatus – its pointer observable – is in the end no longer entangled with the system,
but the classical correlation remains. Decoherence is associated with the transfer of information about the
to-be-classical observables to the environment. Classically, such information transfer is of no consequence.
In quantum physics it is, however, absolutely crucial, as it is responsible for the effective classicality of
certain quantum observables, and for the relatively objective existence of preferred pointer states.
c) Noise is a process in which a pointer observable of the apparatus is perturbed by the environment.
Noise differs from the purely quantum decoherence – now the environment acts as a control, and the
c-nots which represent it carry information in the direction opposite to the decoherence c-nots. Usually,
both decoherence and noise are present. Preferred pointer observables and the associated pointer states
are selected so that the noise is minimized.
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